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A POINT OF ORDER 
by Stephen A. Tyler 
The hstric  literature of India contains a native theory about the origin 
and structure of caste society. This theory is examined .first through 
those propositions w-hich set .forth the duties of castes and the proper 
relations between them, but because the propositions and the texts 
themselves portend more than a statement o f  proper caste relations 
and seek to resolve a discontinuity between revealed doctrine and every- 
day practice, the analssis shfis to what it is that constitutes this prob- 
lem as a problem. Indologists and anthropologists alike have dismissed 
the native solution, but in so doing have failed to understand what really 
motivated it. This paper argues that the apparent problem-the exist- 
ence of more castes than doctrine allowed-and the apparent solution 
-new castes arise through miscegenation-presuppose other more 
fundamental notions about the relation between cosmic and social 
order, and it is with reference to these, rather than the presuppositions 
of Indologj~ and anthropology, that the problem and its solution must 
be understood. 
KEY WORDS: cognitive anthropology, caste, structural analysis, marriage, 
semantics, exchange, India, religion-cosmology, social organization 
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe: the starry 
heavens above me and the moral law w~thln me.. . . I associate them directly w ~ t h  the con- 
sclousness of my own existence. 
Kant 
PROLOGUE 
Whether we speak in cold mathematical parables of the myths of modern 
science o r  relate those of ancient religion in symbols grown smooth and 
warm to the tongue through long and familiar use, still we speak a language 
of metaphor and only spin fables of the birth and death of the cosmos. 
Where we imagine a difference between the language of science and the 
voice of religion, the skeptic finds unity; and when we seek to abandon 
language altogether, seeing it as the last wedge of ignorance separating the 
structure of mathematics from cosmic order, he reminds us that this is 
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only an ancient urge to  compass the cosmos through metaphor and bend 
nature to analogy, that others have thought their vast, self-confirming 
systems of knowledge revealed the order of life in the order of the cosmos. 
Thus reproved, we little care if our object of analysis is a myth of modern 
science or of ancient religion, for we find in both the same structures of 
thought, the same dialectical movements, the same metaphors, and the 
same exalted pride that tempts us to see the order of things in the order of 
our language. 
INTRODUCTION 
Dharma-no word in any language more surely evokes intimations of 
cosmic order or so sharply awakens our slumbering sense of determinate 
transcendental moral obligation. Certainly our English word "law," which 
we have "drawn and quartered" into the divine, the natural, the human, 
and the statistical, robbing it not only of its transcendence but finally of 
its determinateness, no longer quickens our estivating moral imagination 
either with insinuations of cosmic transcendence or presentiments of 
morality. Derived from the Sanskrit root denoting "that which 
bears, supports, upholds or arranges," dharma refers to the established 
order of things and includes in its range of meaning law, natural law, statute, 
decree, ordinance, usage, custom, prescribed conduct, rule, duty, right, 
justice, morality, virtue, religious merit, and good works. Unlike Western 
law, dharma brooks no division. It is the totality of law, not just religious, 
civil, and natural law, but whatever is "law-full," whatever manifests 
order. Because all ordered things participate in dharma the laws of man 
are not puny human creations, they are reflections of cosmic law. 
The sacred Sanskrit literature of India contains an extensive class of 
works devoted to  dharma. Known as the Dharma b s t r a s ,  the "science of 
order," they detail the nature of the correspondence between cosmic and 
social order. Like those modern scientists who seek to  establish harmony 
between the natural and social order, the ancient authors of the Dharma 
~ ~ s t r a s  were practical men. Confronted with a world of law dishonored 
and sacred traditions contaminated by barbarous practices, they compiled 
handbooks of dharma. Behind the chaos of conflicting codes and customs 
they saw a luminous order which enabled them to diagnose the causes of 
the disorder around them and to  point the way to a social order reconsti- 
tuted in accordance with cosmic law. 
Theirs was not the neat, orderly world of revealed scripture. Where 
sacred doctrine spoke only of a society consisting of four hierarchically 
arranged social classes (varnas)-the priestly BrBhmans, the ruling or 
warrior Ksatriyas, the merchant and agricuItural VaiSyas, and the laboring 
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gfidras-they lived among a confusion of castes CjZitis) whose names were 
unattested in scripture, whose origins were obscure, whose duties and 
obligations often conflicted, and whose hierarchic ranks were confounded. 
Their world had literally outgrown its scriptural classifications and they 
faced a taxonomic crisis. 
In its most concrete form their problem was to reconcile received doctrine 
and social facts by aligning varnas and jstis. Their solution was to  derive 
the latter from the former through the mechanism of miscegenation. 
Children born of unions between persons of different varnas did not be- 
come members of either parent's varna, but instead became founders of 
wholly new classes known as jstis. Their children's children might form 
other new jiitis by similarly failing to  marry in their parent's class, and so 
on. By the simple means of exogamous marriage the sages demonstrated 
the possibility of an  expanding universe of $iris. They located the cause of 
the confusion of castes in the practice of marrying outside one's own varna 
-of failing to  marry according to the law (dharma). Lapses in the per- 
formance of duty (dharma) brought on disorder (adharma). 
As might be expected, much theoretical discussion in the Dharma 
h s t r a s  focuses on redefining the concept of lawful marriage, and of work- 
ing out alternative consequences for unlawful ones. In this discussion the 
sages covertly addressed a larger problem of which the confusion of classes 
was only a symptom. Their real problem was to understand permanence 
and change, and to  devise a rationale for change so that it would not 
threaten the social order, The problem was symbolized on the one hand by 
the fixed, changeless, transcendental varnas of revealed scripture, and on 
the other by the growing, changing jztis of the phenomenal world, By 
making ja'tis the product of unlawful unions among members of the four 
varuas they hoped not only to account for the development and growth of 
jatis, but more importantly to provide a mechanical method for assigning 
jiitis their appropriate positions in the hierarchy, thereby preserving order. 
They accomplished this second aim by deriving the order of jZti rank from 
the order of varna rank, that is, by using the varna system as a homological 
base. 
When we understand the problem in these terms we recognize it as the 
social reflex of a cosmo1ogical problem whose themes can be found in the 
earliest speculations in the Rg Veda and traced through the more sophisti- 
cated philosophical literature of later times. 1 refer here to the well-known 
lndra myth-a tale of combat belween the gods and demons for control of 
the life-giving waters which make possible the growth, development, and 
expansion of the universe. The demons want to  bind up the waters, to 
prevent differentiation or expansion, and the gods of course desire just the 
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opposite. In the later system of Siimkhya philosophy these symbolic values 
are inverted and the great aim of life is t o  prevent expansion, to return to 
an  undifferentiated state (cf. Tyler 1973:71-73). The synthesis of these two 
conflicting solutions constitutes the body of thought that we have come to 
know as Hinduism. The quest for equilibrium, a dynamic balance between 
change and permanence, the t y o  contending forces of the cosmos, charac- 
terizes not only the Dharma Siistras but the whole of Hinduism. What 
seemed at  first a rather simple problem of the social order now stands 
revealed as a restatement of one of the most significant themes of Indian 
thought, o r  for that matter, of any thought, namely, "Can the cosmos 
expand infinitely without degenerating into chaos?" 
If the Dharma h s t r a s  make the origin and growth of the caste system 
the determinate product of a more encompassing cosmological theory, why 
have anthropologists and Indologists almost unanimously rejected this 
native theory, dismissing it as a BrBhman fabrication? The  answer is that 
Western scholars have interpreted the question from a different presuppo- 
sitional base. They have assumed that change and development, particu- 
larly as they imply progress, are good. Permanence, o r  anything that 
resists change, is not progressive and implies social stagnation. As for the 
caste system itself, nearly all Westerners have an  abiding distaste for it 
betrayed by their fascination with it, and unlike the SZstric sages, calumniate 
it as the chief instrument of tradition and major impediment to social 
change. Moreover, because they have naively assumed that the h s t r i c  
account ought to be an  objective interpretation of historical facts, they have 
argued that the account is wrong on objective grounds. In the first place 
they observe that  the varnas were ideological rather than empirical classes 
-Indian society probably never actually consisted of just the four scriptural 
classes. Secondly, many contemporary castes marry exogamously without 
endangering the structure of local hierarchies. Finally, since many castes 
are known to have been tribes, they have obviously become castes by 
incorporation rather than miscegenation. 
Though these objections are reasonable enough from the standpoint of 
objective scholarship, that tradition of scholarship itself obstructs our 
understanding by tricking us into thinking that the interpretation of the 
past serves no transcendental master other than objective scholarship. 
Objective scholarship_simply does not come to  grips with the problem as 
it is conceived in the Ssstras, and it utterly fails to account for the hold that 
the h s t r i c  model of society has on the Indian imagination. Why, for 
example, d o  tribes incorporated into the caste hierarchy almost universally 
legitimize their status with a mythological case of miscegenation, deriving 
their origin as a caste from a n  illicit union between one of their women and 
a man of one of the first two varnas, and why is it always a n  illicit union 
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between a tribal ctlornan and a male of one of the varnas rather than the 
other way around? Why mythologize in the first place, and why mythologize 
in just this way? In the same vein, we may ask why landholding castes 
from one end of India t o  the other have martial pretensions or make them- 
selves out to be descendants of warriors. Or more generally, why do  Indian 
villagers commonly divide themselves into four rather broadly defined 
groups which they homologize with the four varnas? 
These things appear odd to the empirical understanding because they do  
not readily respond to material interpretation. They are symbolic values 
rather than material significances, and as symbols of an idea of order it is 
no more likely for them to signify its material conditions than it is for 
those conditions to symbolize the idea of order. This general observation 
is nowhere better illustrated than in the failure of empirical studies to 
understand why castes are ranked the way they are without invoking the 
varna theory. Time and again empirical studies document the facts of 
hierarchical rank, and as often fail to relate those facts to  any determinate 
set of material conditions which might produce them. They fail because 
they seek simple links between the symbolic order and material conditions, 
forgetting that little in the material world directly influences our concep- 
tions of it. We better understand the symbolic order when we recapture it 
in the immanent forms of its expression-in the categorial and proposi- 
tional devices of language and thought. 
We thus constitute native conceptions by means of native accounts, and 
we know how the natives conceive of the world when we understand how 
they account for it in their accounts of it. We now know, for example, that 
the scriptural varna scheme is a means of accounting for jiitis, not only in 
the ~ ~ s t r a s  but among contemporary Indians as well. The jZitis are homo- 
Iogously related to the varna categories and both are lexical structures 
exemplifying the same underlying logical principles (Dumont 1970:67-68; 
Leach 1967: 10-1 1; Tyler 1973:82-83). Dumont correctly characterizes this 
logic as one of sequential oppositions of dichotomously contrasted semantic 
features, the result of which is always a ranking of categories. This logistic 
system corresponds to a particular semantic structure known as a tree 
(Tyler 1973:82). What is not clear, or  more precisely, what is left to the 
reader's intuition is how this static structure of features distributed across 
a set of vocabulary items (the names of varnas) entails a particular and 
definitive set of relations between categories. That is, "how does the formal 
semantic structure of a vocabulary set relate to anything other than its 
own formal properties?" 
This by now familiar question in cognitive anthropology has induced a 
number of ambiguous, if not contradictory responses, some of which rest 
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on a confusion of formal and causal models. Now, although it is quite true 
that the world makes no sense unless you can see it a s  something else, and 
this is precisely what all models facilitate, it is not true that the only good 
model is a causaI one. Formal and causal models have different uses and 
different implications. My answer to the previous question, then, is that 
a formal model relates primarily to other formal models and to the pro- 
cedures by which one formal model may be derived from or  otherwise 
related to some other formal model. It is part of this view, but not demon- 
strated here, that t o  the extent that causal models are models, they are 
simply a subspecies of formal models. 
More specifically, the answer I propose is that the concepts expressed 
by lexemes have ontological commitments which both constitute and 
reflect constraints on the construction of propositions containing these 
concepts (lexemes). On this interpretation, propositions have the function 
of relating concepts, but there are constraints on what concepts can be 
related in the same proposition (cf. Tyler 1969:16-17). Such constraints 
are commonly known as  co-occurrence .restrictions in linguistics, but in 
less elevated language, it may be that I a m  saying nothing more conse- 
quential than that we don't normally say, for example, "The sheep dogs 
are flying high tonight" unless some metaphorical or indexical sense of 
sheep dogs or flying high is intended. But that is not inconsequential. For 
one thing, it implies that when I am out for an evening stroll, I a m  not 
constantly on the alert for flying sheep dogs, o r  a t  least for low flying ones. 
In other words, it is part of my commonplace knowledge about the world 
that flying sheep dogs are rather unusual. Now it is just in this sense that 
the vocabulary of any language provides the initial clue t o  that information 
which it is important for anyone who speaks a language to  know, and it is 
in this sense that languages have ontoIogical commitments. Their vocabu- 
laries tell us what there is. Not all of it, of course, but most of it, and quite 
likely everything that is important. And the co-occurrence restrictions tell 
us what to expect of what there is, Taken together they comprise a structure 
of commonplace knowledge. 
All this may sound quite conservative since it deals with rather obvious 
categories of semantic analysis. In essence, we have the meanings of words 
and the meanings of propositions, both of which refer to language as a 
system of conventions, This, of course, is an inadequate inventory of the 
means by which languages mean. It exploits only one aspect of context of 
use-that of words in propositions-and takes a rather narrow view of the 
functions of utterances, focusing as  it does on overt cognitive form or 
what might be called primary conceptual content. In a word, it focuses on 
the objective and conventional aspects of language to  the exclusion of such 
interpretive or expressive features as social context, speaker's intentions, 
hearer's interpretive procedures, and so  on. Aside from complexity, the 
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major justification for focusing on convention at  the expense of intention is 
that this paper is based on textual analysis rather than speech. This is not 
to say that the texts are neutral and unoccasioned. Quite the contrary: they 
were obviously composed with a purpose and directed to an  audience, but 
for present purposes we merely assume that contextual features relating to  
the situation of a discourse, such as who initiated the discourse and to 
whom it was directed, with what intention, are often not fully recoverable 
in the case of ancient and anonymous texts. Texts are at any rate not fully 
communicative. Like all language reduced to writing, much that is specified 
in speech or taken for granted in its setting is repressed in a text. Unlike the 
speech situation, the text presupposes an anonymous and distant audience 
which has no rights of interruption or immediate rebuttal. Texts can be 
anonymous, but anonymous speech is so anomalous that people frequently 
say "Thank you" to the telephone recording that says "you have dialed 
incorrectly. . . ." Though we must often out of necessity give up the search 
for the elusive author and his intended audience, we can never abandon 
the presumption that the text had or has a purpose, that the author had 
something in mind that urged him to communicate through writing, and 
knowing something about this purpose may provide our most important 
key to interpreting the text. This is true even in deciphering unknown 
scripts. If we were certain about the uses of the lndus seals, for example, we 
might have an important clue that would lead to deciphering the lndus 
script. In the case of the texts under examination here, a part of my inter- 
pretation rests on the assumption that  the authors, confronted by a world 
that seemed to contradict received doctrine, were motivated to  write in 
order to  communicate their solutions to this problem. Moreover, they were 
motivated by man's common atavistic urge to find determinate order in 
the world's ungainly happenings. 
Though it is usually true that authors have something in mind before 
they set pen to paper, it is the unusual text that does not betray the inchoate 
character of the author's original ideas. Despite what often amounts to 
incredible feats of editing and re-working, the emergent nature of an 
author's thought is evident in his text just as the emergent nature of speech 
can be captured in recordings. Whether writing o r  speaking, We only 
know what we had in mind after we communicate it, and even then much 
remains inscrutable, All of which is to  say that texts, like all accounts, are 
characterized by tell-tale evidences of systematization and residues of cast- 
off developmental stages. These stigmata of imperfection and organic 
growth attest not only to  their human provenience-one of the taken-for- 
granted features that makes them genuine rather than spurious texts-but 
also constitute important clues for interpreting obscure concepts. Then too, 
they are intrinsically interesting documents of that mortal combat between 
the author and his muse, and they stir in us a sense of kinship as  we recon- 
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struct the struggle between his ends-in-view and the instrument of his 
expression. 
Context of situation may be difficult to construct for texts, but the 
context of discourse that the text itself establishes is another matter. Unlike 
the fleeting propositions of speech which so quickly fade from memory, 
those of the text are fixed and can be returned to again and again. They 
need not be reconstituted in memory every time we want to refer to them. 
What texts lose in specificity of situational context, they compensate for in 
permanence and specificity of context of discourse. A text sets up a universe 
qf discourse and partially reveals within itself how its constituent concepts 
are to  be understood by the role they play in the discourse. By a universe of 
discourse we understand a context of propositions that limits the possi- 
bilities of interpretation for any proposition in the text. For example, 
"cats have claws" may have different interpretations depending on the 
discourse of which it is a part, but once a frame of reference has been 
established, only those interpretations appropriate to that frame of refer- 
ence will constitute meaningful interpretations (cf. Hymes 1962:194). 
A universe of discourse is a systematically organi~ed whole, and it is 
important to emphasize that our understanding of concepts in context is 
constrained by the need to see the context holistically, even if what counts 
as the totality of a discourse constantly undergoes expansion and retraction. 
The wholeness of a discourse is not an objective fact, even if we sometimes 
so construe it. Nor is it a question of precise boundaries that constitutes our  
orientation to the whole, but our need to see things as totalities, our con- 
struction of tentative wholes that is important. It is thus normal for our 
interpretations of concepts to vary depending on how we have temporarily 
constituted their relevant universes. As we read a book, for example, our 
understanding of the author's meaning frequently changes from chapter to 
chapter, and only after we have finished the book are we able to get a clear 
notion of its critical concepts or of the work as a whole. Too, this interpre- 
tation is subject to change if we see the work in the larger context of similar 
works, and so on. It goes without saying that occurrence of concepts in 
such finite contexts as books is no guarantee that we will always come to a 
clear understanding of them. Our understanding-or the author's-may 
be defective and the totality we seek cannot be constituted. Nonetheless, 
that our understanding constructs a universe that transcends the mere 
occurrence of a concept or proposition is the important point, and it does 
not matter if our universe of discourse is inconstant. 
More important are the interpretive procedures brought to bear on the 
text itself. A text, like any account, is constituted as a whole by interpreting 
its propositions as founding coherent relations among concepts so that 
some concepts entail, presuppose, or  imp1.v other concepts. The coherence 
of a text is partly given by logical relations among its constituent proposi- 
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tions and partly by similar logical reference to notions not explicitly men- 
tioned in the text. For example, if someone says: "I believe in witches but 
not the devil," we may rightly think that he either does not know or  chooses 
to ignore the fact that witches are persons who receive their occult powers 
in a compact with the devil. Since the very definition of witch includes 
mention of the devil and a presupposition of his existence, one cannot 
have witches without the devil unless one intends something else. Entail- 
ments d o  not always work so smoothly. Saying a cow is a quadruped does 
not commit one to a belief in the existence of a n  incarnate quadruped. 
Quadrupeds are fine conceptually, but they don't give much milk. Some- 
what in the manner of entailments, presuppositions also direct our  attention 
beyond the concept or proposition itself to what it supposes. If I should 
say "pass me the pie," it might be considered odd if there were no pie in 
evidence, unless of course there were some other plausible interpretation of 
my desire for  non-existent pies. This case illustrates a common presuppo- 
sition; namely, there is generally a discoverable interpretation for what 
people say which will make their having said it reasonable. This presuppo- 
sition is part of the mutual credit of human communication. Still, it does 
not mean that everything said will be rational. For example, if we are told: 
"All witches have brooms, but there are no witches," we are justified in 
feeling that something is odd about the implicational structure of this 
proposition and we may question the rationality behind it. 
In addition to  entailment, presupposition, and implication, which may 
operate overtly within the text and in our  interpretive procedures, there 
are equally important procedures more normally but not exclusively 
restricted to the internal structure of the text. These have the effect of 
making two different concepts identical either by direct assignment of 
identity as in the case of metaphor, by a proportional equivalence of 
features which preserves a given pattern of relationships as in the case of 
analogy and homology, o r  by direct substitution of so-called "pro-forms," 
that is by substituting a different name fo r  the same concept. The latter is 
frequently only a stylistic device to avoid repetition, but has other uses, as, 
for example, in epithets, reciting the names of a deity by reference to  his 
attributes, avoidance of reprehensible o r  tabooed names, flattery, insult, 
derision, and many more. Significantly, the assignment of identities either 
deliberately or  unconsciously suppresses or  deletes some features of the 
concepts related and magnifies others, thus effecting a kind of transforma- 
tion of meaning. Other transformations are brought about through inversion 
and negation. Finally, some concepts and metaphoric procedures are  so 
deeply imbedded in the text that they constitute archetypes-key words 
and symbols whose meanings dominate the text and provide the base for 
metaphoric extension. Some archetypes are s o  submerged in the categories 
of language that  they are practically inaccessible even to  the finest analysis. 
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Because they often constitute the terms which make the world intelligible, 
it is absurd to believe that we can get outside these concepts or  hold them 
in a neutral pattern while we look a t  them and remodel them. They are 
part of the given. 
There are other more obvious features of texts which, though obvious, 
nonetheless comprise part of what makes us respond to  a text a s  a n  appro- 
priate example of the  genre. It ought to have or  at  least portend a beginning 
and an  end. It ought to have a focused topic o r  be about something, and it 
should have what I shall call transitivity of in?plication, a certain develop- 
mental tension-to give a sense of the movement of ideas, that it is "going 
somewhere." This is not necessarily a temporal dimension, though it may 
well be, but rather a question of the sequentiality of themes and sub-topics. 
At a minimum, some things come after others and there is a reason for it. 
Simple juxtaposition of propositions or  parts of a text is a basis for 
inferring a relation between the things juxtaposed. Thus every schoolboy 
is taught to outline the structure of themes-a procedure that rests on 
intuitive relations of inclusion and contrast. We interpret the members of 
a set of juxtaposed propositions in the same level of contrast as instances 
of evidentiary, exemplary, causal, or  counter-factual relations, even when 
these relations are not overtly signaled by their appropriate syntactic forms. 
When propositions are juxtaposed either in time or  space we are inclined 
to relate them (cf. Hymes 1973:348). Contrast between propositions or  
parts of a text often takes the form of antinomy, either overtly expressed 
o r  only implied by position in the text. When antinomies occur we are 
seldom content with mere paradox and expect resolution. We anticipate 
dialectical movemenr. Oppositions between contrasting concepts should be 
reconciled in a higher level synthesis, and if they are not we sense incom- 
pleteness. 
Both the author and reader of a text presume the reader's ability to 
interpret creatively-even if this amounts to nothing more than the ability 
to supply missing information from background knowledge. The text need 
not-indeed cannot-provide all the particulars of its own interpretation. 
nor can it formally exclude all possible interpretations. Readers are ex- 
pected to supply missing information o r  to invent a n  interpretation of the 
significance of its absence (cf. Garfinkel 1964). In the interpretation of 
ancient texts in foreign languages it is this presumption that creates the 
greatest difficulties in translation and interpretation. We simply d o  not 
know what background knowledge is called for. Because we d o  not know 
the normative forms presupposed by the text and its author, we are cut off 
from the creative reflexivity that exists between the text and its culture. At 
best we supply only a confused approximation based on our understanding 
of the foreign culture and derived ultimately from the normative forms of 
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our own culture. How we interpret such a text perhaps reveals more of 
ourselves than of the text or of the culture behind it. 
It is important to  discriminate between the notions of propositional and 
lexical analysis proposed here and those currently modish in linguistics. 
The chief difference concerns the situatedness and the pragmatically 
occasioned character of concepts and propositions (cf. Hymes 1972). The 
contemporary fashion in semantic analysis in linguistics, whether of the 
interpretive (Katz 1972) or generative (McCawley 1968; Lakoff 1971) style 
is to analyze indiscriminately any collection of words or propositions, the 
only apparent constraint on choice being either prosaicness or outlandish- 
ness. It is not surprising that anthropological linguists, who have always 
been more sensitive to aspects of context, should be suspicious of sample 
analyses consisting of sentences chosen largely for their titillating effect on 
a small coterie of linguists rather than for their critical role in a conceptual 
pattern or body of discourse. 
It is not that analysis based on a paradigm case is necessarily suspect, 
but one does wonder what conceivable context or pragmatic interest might 
occasion such a paradigm case as "*The salami is sleeping" (Lakoff 1971: 
330), or, for that matter, "The sheep dogs are flying high tonight." These 
starred (*), context-free sentences which are supposedly semantically 
ambiguous or incoherent always invite an interpretation. Thus, my reaction 
to "*The salami is sleeping" is "How coincidental, Lakoff knows my Uncle 
George." The point, of course, is that we d o  not normally come upon such 
utterances outside a context, and when we do, we supply an appropriate 
one as part of our normal interpretive procedures-unless the context 
provides reason to believe that we should momentarily suspend interpre- 
tation. 
Linguistics shares with philosophy a penchant for critical examples 
lacking readily interpretable situations of use, outside of the taken-for- 
granted universe of linguistic and philosophical discourse, and because such 
instances as are adduced are problematic only within this rather rarefied 
context, linguistic and philosophical discussions of meaning exude an air 
of unreality. In like manner, psycholinguistic research incorrectly assumes 
that what is arbitrarily problematic within the particularly restricted con- 
text of an experimental situation is similarly or analogously problematic 
within a universalized non-experimental situation. A significant part of 
the neglected context then, is: "What is problematic here?' or, "The prob- 
lem is, 'what is the problem?" We come to know, for example, of the 
noxiousness of the seemingly innocuous sentence "The present King of 
France is bald" only when we are acquainted with its role in the philosoph- 
ical discussion of the problem of reference (cf. Russell 1920). Such sentences 
are indexical. They stand for an entire conceptual scheme. One might, for 
example, capture the whole problematic of logical atomism in the indexical 
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sentence: "Were it not for the fact that his unicorn went lame, Russell 
would necessarily have caught the bald present king of France on the 
golden mountain by the extended green light of the morning o r  evening 
star." Anyone acquainted with this tradition will readily recogni7e the 
now fusty problems of a once lively conceptual order indexed by the syn- 
tactic form of this sentence and its fragments of former paradigm cases. 
This particular case also illustrates another aspect of "probIematics." 
That is, we must almost always distinguish between the overt problem 
being addressed directly and those covert or  surreptitious concepts that 
make the overt problem a sensible problem. In Russell's case, the overt 
problem of reference is articulated within a covert theory of meaning 
which takes giving names to things as the archetype for all forms of mean- 
ing. When Wittgenstein exposed the faulty footings of this theory of mean- 
ing, that is, made the previously unproblematic covert concepts problematic, 
the problem of reference ceased to be a problem of meaning. In the eresent 
case, I argue that although one of the overt problems addressed by the S'astric 
writers (and contemporary anthropologists) was how jZtis relate to  varnas, 
the covert problem referred to underlying ideas that we might gloss with the 
familiar oppositions order and disorder, permanence and change, and good 
and evil. And finally, part of our  problem in understanding these texts arises 
from our infatuation with a conceptual scheme that  assigns a positive valua- 
tion (good) to order and change while the texts presuppose both a different 
valuation and a different set of oppositions. 
This introduction is a brief, oversimplified sketch of a complex subject, 
but it should be sufficient to  indicate something of the range of procedures 
and assumptions involved in this paper, where I make explicit use of such 
notions a s  lexical analysis, propositional analysis, and homological struc- 
ture in an  attempt to  make clear certain archetypes and their, processes of 
metaphoric extension in a body of literature known as SZstras.' The 
archetypes involved are concepts of order and disorder, change and per- 
sistence. The key terms are given as the analysis unfolds. Lest we lose our 
way in this jungle of analytic procedure, let me insert a reminder that ou r  
aim is to reconstruct what the ancient and now anonymous authors of 
these texts had in mind-both consciously and unconsciously. 
LEXICAL ANALYSIS: THE V A R N A  HIERARCHY 
Early Sanskrit tradition divides society into two broad groups: Aryan 
and non-Aryan. The former is subdivided into four hierarchically ranked 
groups (varn?~):  Brahmans (priests), Ksatriyas (warriors), VaiSyas (mer- 
chants), and Sildras (servants). The latter consists of Dasyus (slaves) and 
Mlechchas (barbarian foreigners). T o  illuminate the structure of this system 
we define the following: a set A consisting of subsets { V ,  T), denoting 
Aryan and non-Aryan respectively, where: V  = {B, K, V, S)  and T = { D ,  M),  
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where B = Brahman, K = Ksatriya, V = VaiSya, S = Siidra; D = Dasyu, 
M = Mlechcha; and a set G = {w, W, x, X, y, 7, z, z), where w = is Aryan, 
a = is non-Aryan, x = is twice born (Dvija), R = is once born, y = has 
dominion over men, 7 = does not have dominion over men, z = has a sacer- 
dotal function, 2. = does not have a sacerdotal function, such that the inter- 
section of A and G ( A X  G) yields the following distribution of attributes: 
This reads: B is a n  Aryan, is twice born, has dominion over men, and has 
a sacerdotal function; and s o  on for each class. Since D and M d o  not con- 
trast on the attributes listed here we will treat them as a single category, .@, 
defined as the empty set for V, thus redefining V as {B, K ,  V, s,B). For the 
nature of the contrast between D and M ,  see Tyler (1973:82). In more 
familiar matrix form this distribution is seen in diagram 1 .  
G 
- 
w x y z  
DIAGI~AM 1 M \ ~ R I X D I ' I l ' R I l ~ U T I 0 ? !  0 1  DI; GR,\\I 2 SLM\NTIC ~HCI:OI VARY \ 
\ r  rn1111 TLS ( G )  ov CI \\SES ( V )  R \ N  ( 5  (Cf Tyler 1973 82) 
In diagram 2, relative rank is automatically assigned by sums of positive 
attributes. Thus in rank order B = 4, K = 3, V = 2, S = 1, kf = 0. 
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It should be noted that the attributes of set G may be redefined in a great 
many ways, but so long as the distribution of positive attributes (however 
defined) remains constant, the ranking remains constant. For example, the 
texts themselves offer the following alternative attributes expressed as 
duties and livelihoods or occupations. The twice born are to study the 
Vedas, perform sacrifices, and give alms. In addition, the Brahman teaches 
the Vedas, performs sacrifices for others, and receives alms, the Ksatriya 
protects the people and receives taxes, the VaiSya tends cattle, and the 
Sidra serves all the others. Visnu (V, 5-14, Jolly 1880:I2-13) defines the 
dominant attributesas shown in diagram 3. 
DIAGRAM 3. V A R Y &  DUTIES A N D  LIVELIHOODS ACCORDING TO  ISN NU 
PROPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS: THE RELATIONS AMONG V A R N A  CATEGORIES 
The preceding discussion of duties and livelihoods leads to the question 
of recipients of the dutiful actions. Aside from the fact that they are cate- 
gorically incumbent on varna members, in the sense that one must perform 
one's varna duties because performing them is an almost compulsive ex- 
pression of one's varna nature, the actions have to be directed toward some- 
one else, and the answer is, of course, the other varnas. Formally expressed, 
the injunction to perform duties is seen as a relation between ordered pairs 
of varnas. The relation (function) in each case is reflexive, intransitive, 
and symmetrical, and is defined by the open sentence: ,f = a, b, P(x, JV), 
which assigns a particular relation to each ordered pair of varnas. Thus, for 
example in the first line of the function J below, the ordered pair consists 
of BrBhman (B) and BrBhman (B); "teaches and performs sacrifice for" 
is substituted for P; BrZhma~ is substituted for x and BrZhmap is substi- 
tuted for y. The open sentence P(x, y) is interpreted as "teaches BrBhmans, 
Brahmans" or "performs sacrifice for BrBhmans, BrBhmans," or in normal 
English word order as "BrBhmans teach Brshmans, Brahmans sacrifice for 
Brahmans." 
LIVELIHOODS 
Sacrifice and receive alms 
Receive taxes 
Agriculture, trade 
Practice of arts 
VARNA 
BrBhman 
Ksatriya 
VaiSya 
Sfidra 
DUTIES 
Teach 
Practice at arms 
(Protect the people) 
Tend cattle 
Serve 
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B, B P(x, y) where P(x, J)) = B teaches or performs sacrifices for B  
B, K  P(x, y) where P(x, y) = B teaches or performs sacrifices for K 
B, V  P(x, y)  where P(x, y )  = B teaches or performs sacrifices for V  
/ K ,  K  P(x, y) where P(x, y) = K protects (rules) K  
K,  B P(x, y) where P(.r, y) = K  protects (rules) B 
K,  V  P(x, y) where P(x, .y)= K protects (rules) V  
( K,  S P(x,j>) where P(x, J?) = K  protects (rules) S  
/ V ,  V  P(x, y) where P(x, 11) = V  gives goods (alms, taxes) to V  
V ,  B P(x,y) where P(x, y) = V  gives goods (alms, taxes) to B  
V ,  K P(x, y) where P(x, y) = V  gives goods (alms, taxes) to K 
( V ,  S  P(x,,Y) where P(.r, y) = V  gives goods (alms, taxes) to S  
S ,  S  P(x, y) where P(.r, y) = S  serves (gives labor to) S 
S ,  B P(x, y) where P(x, y) = S serves (gives labor to) B 
S ,  K  P(x, y) where P(x, 12) = S  serves (gives labor to) K  
S ,  V  P ( x , ~ 3  where P(x, y) = S  serves (gives labor to) V  
The interrelationships among groups are not clear from this presentation, 
but if we now take the product functions (composition of functions) for 
these groups, we have the following: 
. f B , K = g o h o i ,  g o h  
f B , V = h o  i, h o g ,  h o g 0  i  
g  K ,  B=.f 0 h 
g K , V = h o f ,  h o  i o f :  h o i  
g  K,  S = i  0.f; i  o h ,  i o f  o h ,  i o h  o f  
h V , B = f  o g ,  f o g  o i, 
h V , K = g  0 . f :  g  o i 
h V , S = i o g ,  i o f o g ,  i o f  
i  S ,  B = f  n g ,  f o g  o h ,  f  o h  
i  S , K = g  o f  0 h ,  g o  h  
i S ,  V = h  o g. 
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This signifies that one functi0n.f which relates B and K is equivalent to the 
compound functions g, h, i and g, h. That is, because B is related to S by i, 
S to V by h, and V to K by g ,  B and K are related by the functions g, h, i. 
Similarly because B is related to  V by h and V to  K by g there is a relation 
between B and K defined by the functions g, h. These relationships are 
more readily apparent in diagram 4. When these relations are stated in this 
way, it is obvious that they delineate a system of exchange. The structure 
of this system is represented in diagram 4. 
DIAGRAM 4 CAYLEY DIAGRAM OF EXCFIANGE OF DUTIES AMONG VARN,!~. Re- 
flexlvity IS lndlcated by the clrcular loops emanating from and terminating In each 
labeled node. Exchanges between groups are ~ndlcated by s~gned arrows between 
labeled nodes, the signscorrespond~ngwith the funct~onsdeflned onp. 125. 
Since there is no  arrow from B to  S in diagram 4, it is apparent that this 
is not a system of direct reciprocal exchange. It should be noted t k t  the 
arrows between V and  S are highly problematic. The texts d o  allow Siidras 
to  serve VaiSyas, but only wealthy, high class ones, and only when they 
cannot find a Brahman or  Ksatriya to serve. 
Given these relations, it is important to  discover if any one set comprises 
an ordering of the sets of varnas and in particular a rank ordering. We want 
to know whether this system of exchange entails a dominance structure. 
That is, when we say that K protects B, does K dominate B and B dominate 
V and V dominate S? When 1 speak of ordering, 1 intend it in the technical 
sense of the transitivity and connectivity of relations (cf. Suppes 1957:223). 
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Since all of the relations between varnas are by definition intransitive, it is 
not possible that any single function can comprise an  ordering of the set of 
varfias. That is, although there may be a relation between B and K such 
that B sacrifices for K ,  it does not follow that K sacrifices for V or  S. 
Similarly K may rule B, but B does not rule V or  S. No one function by 
itself can constitute a rank ordering. This implies that we must turn to 
the composition of functions (product functions) in order to discover a 
form of transitivity. If we examine diagram 4, it becomes apparent that 
the composition of functions i o h o g o f constitutes a n  inverse, that is, 
in this instance, a pathway through each node from B to  B (defined by 
f 0, K; g K, V; h V, S; i S,  B). Since this set is characterized as having a n  
inverse, identity, and associativity, it is a mathematical group, and it is 
the inverse relation which establishes the connectivity of the set.3 This 
emphasizes that any single factor interpretation of this system of exchange 
as reflecting the power or  dominance of the Ksatriya is wrong on formal 
grounds. It also alerts us to the inadequacy of any argument which attempts 
to  explain the system simply as a n  economic system, but there are other 
and better arguments against this notion. 
HOMOLOGICAL STRUCTURES: THE VARNAS 
When two or  more structures exhibit the same logical organization, but 
differ only in scale or  in the names of attributes or  classes, we refer to these 
structures as homologous.4 I will now demonstrate that the relation be- 
tween the classical varna system and the contemporary system of jZtis 
(castes) is one of homology. In order to simplify the demonstration 1 will 
work with groups ofjzt is  having the same functional definition rather than 
with individual j'atis. That is to say, since the basis of definition is the same, 
I posit as a conceptual universal a contemporary varna system, V', con- 
sisting of four functionally defined groups: B', priestly jZti(s); K', land- 
owning jSti(s), V', artisan jZti(s), Sf,  untouchable jiiti(s), thus: V' = {B', 
K', V', St, B'); and I also posit a set of attributes G', where G' = { w', Kt, 
x', R', y', Yf, zr, 7' ) such that w' = Hindu, x' = clean, y' = dominates, 
and z'= religious specialist. 
There is a product of G' and V' (G' x V') which gives the situation in 
diagram 5. It is obvious that except for differences in attributes and class 
definitions this is precisely the same structure as that represented for the 
varna system in diagram 2. In fact, under the conventions adopted here, it is 
a particular kind of homomorphism known as a n  isomorphism. That  is, it 
preserves all but the names of attributes and classes. It may seem unlikely 
that semantic structures should display the kind of persistence implied here, 
but that is precisely the argument that is made (see also Tyler 1973: 15 1,  154- 
155). The distribution of features in diagram 5 induces the semantic tree of 
diagram 6. 
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G ' 
- 
w x y z  
DIAGRAM 5. MATRIX DISTRIBIJTION OF DIAGRAM 6 SLMANT~CTREEOFVARNA 
iTTRIRtITEC, G' ON CLASSES V', RANKS 
HOMOLOGICAL STRUCTURES: J A J M ~ N ?  
The early predisposition for defining social groups by attributes entailing 
functions is also characteristic of the contemporary period where functional 
relationships between jiitis are expressed in a system of exchange widely 
known as jajmgni. The jajmgni system is a homology of the functional 
relations between varnas as  they are expressed even in the earliest texts. 
Using the varna categories of the contemporary homology we have the 
following distribution of functions: 
B', B', P(x,p)  where P(x, y) = B' performs sacrifice for B' 
B', K', P(x,y)  where P(x, y )  = B' performs sacrifice for K' 
B', V' ,  P(x, y )  where P(x, y )  = B' performs sacrifice for V' 
Kt, K', P(x, y)  where P(x, y) = K'gives grain to  K' 
K', B', P(x, y )  where P(x, y )  = K'gives grain to B' 
g'= 
K', V', P(x ,y )  where P(x, )I) = K'gives grain to V' 
K', Sf, P(x, y )  where P(x, y) = K'gives grain to Sf 
V',  V', P(x, y )  where P(x, y) = V' gives manufactured goods to V' 
V', B', P(x, y )  where P(x, y) = V' gives manufactured goods to B' 
V', K', P(x,y)  where P(x, y)  = V' gives manufactured goods to  K' 
A POINT OF ORDER 
I S', S', P(x, y) where P ( x ,  y) = S' gives laborto S' i' = S', B', P(x, y) where P ( x ,  y) = S' gives labor to B' S', K', P ( x ,  y )  where P(x ,  y) = S' gives labor t o  K' 
composition of functions yields diagram 7. 
DIAGRAM 7. CAYLEY DIAGRAM OF J A J M ~ N ~ R C L ~ T I O N S .  
In comparing diagram 4 with diagram 7, note that the positions of V and 
K have been inverted. This reflects a difference in the definition of functions 
underlying the two diagrams. The functions underlying diagram 7 do not 
include a relation between the ordered pairs (V,  S) and (S, V), while those 
underlying diagram 4 do. The structure depicted in diagram 7, while 
clearly a homology of the one depicted in diagram 4, is a transformation 
on the structure of diagram 4. The transformation is described by the dele- 
tion of reciprocal relations between V and S. This deletion in turn derives 
from the redefinition of g. That is, where g = a, b, x  gives protection to 1: g' 
= a, b, x gives grain to  y. It is to be noted that the latter can be interpreted 
as one of thk class of propositions that could be generated by h = a, b, x 
gives goods toy .  In simpler terms, giving grain is a kind of giving goods- 
if grain is a kind of good-which means that K has taken over some part 
of the function of V. This is related, of course, to the difference in varna 
attributes for K and K'. In the one case K has the attribute "dominion," 
and in the other K' has the attribute "dominates," reflecting a difference 
in the role of the king and his homologue, the landlord. As readers of Hocart 
(1950) will readily note, there is a certain degradation of the royal style. 
I t  can be objected that what I have characterized as the contemporary 
jajm5ni system is incorrect or at best a gross oversimplification, because it 
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specifies functions for whole jiiti groups rather than for individual jZtis or, 
more precisely, individuals or  families belonging to  individual jztis. There 
are actually three related arguments here: ( I )  there are more than four 
groups; (2) there are more than four functions; (3) the relations are between 
families or  individuals rather than jgtis. Arguments one and three are  
similar because they seek to  expand and redefine the nodes of diagram 7 ,  
whereas argument two advocates expansion of the number of different 
signed arrows. Here 1 advance the argument that expansion, whether of 
nodes or  arrows, is irrelevant to the underlying structure of the system-so 
long as every expansion creates a homomorphism of that underlying 
system. T o  demonstrate, let the following identities obtain: 
R = Venkatayya R a o  (a proper name) 
K = RZmayya RZju (a proper name) 
V = Laksminarsu (a proper name) 
S = Lingu (a proper name) 
and, let the relations between these individuals be as defined for diagram 7. 
Then the structure of diagram 7 remains constant, the only change being 
the substitution of personal names for varna categories. There will be as 
many such structures as there are individuals whose relations are defined 
in this way. Individualization under these conditions simply proliferates 
identical structures. The same argument applies for substitution of jiiti 
names for varna groups. 
Even if substitution of names does not entail a change in structure so  
long as the number of groups and relations remain constant, what are the 
consequences of increasing the number of groups? T o  illustrate, let diagram 
8 be a system of exchange defined as in previous instances, but consisting 
of ten rather than four groups. 
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At first glance there appears to  be a significant difference between the 
structure in diagrams 8 and 7, but closer inspection reveals that they are, 
except for the reflexivity of relations, equivalent. This results from the fact 
that similarity of function makes it possible to define groups as functionally 
equivalent. Thus 0 ,  P, Q are an  equivalence class because they all have the 
same characteristic function (a) and are reciprocally linked to all other 
groups by the same class of function (h, c, 4. The symbols a, b, c, d indicate 
relations between groups. Similarly, R,  U, W are equivalent because they 
have the same characteristic function (c) and are reciprocally linked to all 
other groups by the same class of functions (a, b).  Grouping on the basis of 
similarity of  functional definition yields the following classes of groups: 
(1) B = {T) with function b and reciprocal a, c, d 
(2) K = ( 0 ,  P, Q ) with function a and reciprocal b, c, d 
(3) V = {R, U, W )  withfunctioncand reciprocala, b 
(4) S = { s ,  V ,  X ) withfunctiondand reciprocala 
Since relations between these four classes of groups are defined as: a(#, V )  
( K ,  B) (K ,  S); b(R,  K)  (B ,  V ) ;  c(V,  K) ( V ,  T);  d(S, K )  (S, B) we have the 
equivalence structure illustrated in diagram 9. 
The only difference between diagrams 9 and 7 is the absence of reflexive 
loops in diagram 9. These loops designating reflexive relations were omitted 
only for diagrammatic simplification and their absence indicates no struc- 
tural difficulty. As a further illustration of this point note that the sequences 
T-R-Q-S, T-U-P-X, T-W-0-V in diagram 8 are equivalence structures, 
equivalent to  one another and to the structure of diagrams 9 and 7. The 
important point is that expanding the number of participating groups has 
no effect on the structure of exchange so long as the relations between 
groups are constant. The problem is simply one of discovering which groups 
are functionally equivalent, and I add with emphasis, this is precisely how 
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the problem is posed by the contemporary Indian villager. Classification of 
jztis, and more importantly, their relative positions in the village hierarchy, 
are made by assignments of just the kind outlined here. My claim then is 
that this abstract model is merely a formalization of rules that are psycho- 
logically real. 
If neither the number of groups nor the designation of names (that is, of 
individuals or groups) affects the structure when the definition of functions 
remains constant, what is the effect of increasing the number of functions? 
It is easy to demonstrate that increasing the number of functions has no 
effect on the structure of exchange so long as each constituent group is 
defined as  a homologue of one of the four groups of diagram 7-which is to 
say that new functions are subject to  typing and classification just as new 
groups are. T o  illustrate the point, suppose group B is subdivided into two 
subgroups on the basis of each having a different function. Thus B, officiates 
in temple rituals and B, officiates in domestic rituals. From the point of 
view of any member of B ,  or B,, the difference between these functions is 
significant, requiring rigorous separation of the two groups, but from the 
standpoint of anyone in groups A, D, o r  C, this difference is irrelevant 
because it does not substantiaIIy alter the basic sacerdotal function of which 
officiating in temples and in domestic sacrifices are only differing modes of 
expression. S o  long as  members of A, D, and C can type these functions as 
variant expressions of the same underlying function, proliferation of 
functions within the B group has no significance outside the B group. The 
problem for the native villager then is to  determine by various arbitrary 
means which functions are equivalent. 
If we seek an  objective characterization of this homologizing we are led 
into the temptation of declaring that the structure remains constant if and 
only if ( I )  each constituent group has only one dominant function; (2) each 
constituent group has a unique function; and (3) each constituent group 
has a characteristic relation to a dominant group. Now, it may seem that it 
is precisely these three features that no longer characterize the system of 
exchange in an Indian viIlage. From numerous village studies we know 
that members of the same jgti may have quite different occupations, that 
members of very differently ranked jZtis may work at the same occupations, 
that there is constant and unremitting competition for dominance among 
powerful jiitis, and that the power of dominant jBtis (particularly land- 
holders) is challenged by the availability of new occupations that are inde- 
pendent of the village land system. Much of this is irrefutable, and we seem 
to want to conclude that these objective facts make the jajmgni system im- 
possible as an objective structure. Thus, the argument links two objective 
terms: ( I )  the system as an  objective fact; and (2) its conditions as objective 
facts. The problem here is twofold: ( 1 )  the terms of the argument are actually 
mixed; and (2) the jajmzni system persists, albeit perhaps in truncated 
form, not only as  an  objective system of exchange, but more importantly 
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as a subjeclive system for the assignment of .functional attributes to jrflis. 
It should be abundantly clear by now that the formal structure of the 
jajmgni system can hardly count as an  objective fact. It has been defined 
here appropriately as  a formalization of a structure of thought. Therefore, 
any argument construing it solely a s  an objective fact related to other objec- 
tive facts confuses the terms of the argument by relating a formal structure 
to material conditions having no connection with its formal dimensions. 
Moreover, we are attracted to the conclusion that the objective conditions 
outlined above make it impossible for the native to  homologize divergent 
functions, yet there is nothing in the facts that warrants this conclusion. If 
the objective facts tempt us to  conclude that the jajmzni system cannot 
persist as a system of economic exchange, then why does it persist a t  all? 
The answer is that the jajmiini system is not now, nor ever was, primarily a 
system of economic exchange. It was and is a system of exchange certainly, 
but only incidentally of economic goods. Our  problem arises because we 
construe the movement of economic goods as the primary function of ex- 
change. On  the analogy of physics we focus on transactions that signify just 
the objective movement of things, forgetting that exchange may also affirm 
the moral basis of society. Transactions d o  not just signijj~ the movement 
of goods, they symbolize mutual obligation. The  objective movement of 
goods can only signify the fact of exchange, and because it thus implies 
nothing more than exchange, it cannot by itself reveal its meaning, cannot 
speak of what it symbolizes. We must distinguish then, between transactions 
that merely signify and those that symbolize. Thus, when an Indian farmer, 
from his hard-won crop, gives a traditional share of grain to the blacksmith 
who fashioned his implements of production, it is not just a payment for 
goods and services but an affirmation of a continuing relationship which 
recognizes the fixed pattern of statuses and symbolizes the performance of 
mutual duties. His act symbolizes the moral obligations of the social order. 
It symbolizes dharma in both of its senses as  duty and order, The mutually 
implicated acts of the farmer and the blacksmith are simultaneously ex- 
pressions of their respective duties (dharma) and affirmations of social 
order (dharma). They only incidentally signify the objective movement of 
goods, for that is but a consequence of dharma, not its cause. Transactions 
between groups are thus symbolic affirmations of group ranking. They both 
confirm and constitute the relative positions of groups in the hierarchy. 
Significantly, economic transactions are but one of the many possible 
settings in which these group relations may be symbolized. The giving and 
taking of food, the exchange of women in marriage, precedence in cere- 
monies, patterns of respect and deference in speech and behavior, and 
performance of religious observances serve equally as appropriate settings. 
This does not imply that transactions in these settings will always be inter- 
preted symbolically. Since they are not necessary to  what they symbolize 
they may sometimes be taken as neutral significations, interpreted as  inap- 
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propriatc symbolic vehicles-as in the case of many contemporary economic 
transactions. 
If symbolic scttings are arbitrary and contingent in this way, how can 
participants arrive at consensus, how can they come to agreement about 
the appropriateness or relevance of a given setting'? The answer, of course, 
is that they often disagree and fail to reach consensus, but this merely con- 
firms the negotiated character of symbolism and points to the cognitive 
reality of an underlying ideological constant which serves as  an ideal typifi- 
cation, a paragon of all such situations. I refer to the varna system with its 
cntailed notions of separate classes functionally defined and hierarchically 
related. The varna system functions as a homological base, In any relevant 
transactional setting each group is thought to be functionally defined, to 
have a dominant function relative to that setting, to  have a unique function 
relative to that setting, and to  have a rank relative to other groups in that 
setting. Whatever the setting, each group may be defined homologously 
with the definitions of the varnas In the classical system. The logic of the 
homology remains constant, not its various manifestations. And, even 
though there may still be persistent disagreement over the relevance of any 
given setting, this disagreement only makes sense under the presupposition 
that transactional se~tings may symbolize themoral order. 
in the Dharrna S6stras nothing is more clear than that the moral o r  
cosmic order (dharma) dominates the economic and social orders. This 
view contradicts our notion that "business is business," the predominant 
presumption distilled out of the historical circumstances of the Western 
experience of the industrial revolution. Whether communist o r  capitalist we 
hold that the social order emerges out of the movement of economic goods. 
We first see this conception of society as a transcendent unity created by 
transactions between egoistic atoms in our idea of the market, and we trace 
this purely cognitive transformation of the idea of the market from that of 
a concrete locality to  a transcendental abstraction in the writings of proto- 
economists of the eighteenth century who both effected and documented it. 
In its earlier concrete form the market was simply a neutral place of ex- 
change, the brief meeting of strangers solely for the purpose of handing 
over natural goods, goods which had not been culturally transformed, 
which had not become symbolic. They were places set aside, immuni~ed as 
it were, from the surrounding culture-not just secular places, but places 
of pure objectiviry. They were concrete localities where objects of one kind 
came together in exchange for objects of other kinds. They were meaningless 
places where disparate groups could meet without incurring moral obliga- 
tion, places where citizenship, persona, and soul could be forgotten. Be- 
cause they implied amorality it is not surprising that they should so often 
have been associated with carnivals. Fairs were, and anyone who has in his 
youth walked a midnight midway can affirm that they still are, both places 
of exchange and settings in which everyday morality is temporarily set 
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aside. Fairs, and early markets too, combined exchange with the atmosphere 
of a carnival. 
Though it began in amorality, the market gradually acquired a kind of 
second-hand morality by driving out all other kinds of morality. The market 
itself became a moral system, a symbolic code and source of metaphor so 
powerful that we could even speak of the university a s  a "market place for 
the free exchange of ideas," and conceive of God as Chairman of the Board. 
Seemingly the market could be immunized from culture, but not vice versa. 
Given this presuppositional background, is it any wonder that we mis- 
interpret the jajmgni system and cannot account for its persistence? If we 
limit our view to  those relations that we define as economic functions, and 
then interpret the persistence of the system solely in those terms, we can 
only conclude that it should not exist. But if we understand that economic 
transactions may or  may not be interpreted as symbolic transactions, we 
can understand how the exchange of economic goods can go on without 
necessarily affecting either the ja jmini  system or  the hierarchy of social 
groups. Moreover, we can understand how it may have so done from time 
immemorial. The native mind, which sees economic transactions only as 
potential symbols of group rank, does not (unlike the imagination of the 
anthropologist) seize upon economic exchange as  the only o r  even the 
primary symbol of the relations between groups. Because the jajmZni system 
is only incidentally a system of economic exchange, seeing it solely as a 
system of economic exchange mistakes the system for one of its effects. 
I f  we seek some understanding of the persistence of the jajmsni system, it 
is important to point out that it is first of all a homology of the sacrifice. 
This leads us t o  ask: "What then is the basis for a metaphoric identity be- 
tween exchange and sacrifice?" There are several, such as for example, the 
giving of gifts (cf. Tyler 1973:164-165), but more importantly, both sacrifice 
and exchange imply something about the transformation of one thing into 
another, the assignment or  reassignment of meaning. The root metaphor 
for this whole process is the idea of creation, that original formation of 
order out of chaos, that first transformation of the natural world which 
changed it into a meaningful cultural world. I am suggesting that this 
process of establishing order out of the disarray of natural phenomena 
constitutes the basis for the homology between sacrifice and excha?ge in 
general and jajmsni in particular. Each of the varnas, except the Siidra, 
participates directly in a transformation of the natural world into a n  ordered 
cultural world. Specifically, the BrZhman is concerned with the order of 
the cosmos (dharma), the Ksatriya with the orger of society (artha), and 
the VaiSya with the order of goods (kzma). The,Siidra is himself the symbol 
of nature, the antithesis of culture, and both Siidra and nature are conse- 
quently equated with the demonic. Those who engage in this transformation 
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are polluted by contact with the material of nature, and the more intimately 
their activities involve the original elements of nature, the more polluted 
they are. Beginning with the first mention of the four varnas in the Purusa 
SClkta of the Rg Veda, the texts delight in symbolizing and re-emphasizing 
this relationship. The same hierarchic classification of order, the same 
order of orders, emerges in each context. The order of the cosmos (dharma) 
includes both the order of society (artha) and the economic order (ksma), 
and since the order of the cosmos is purer than the order of society, which 
in turn is purer than the economic order, those who deal with the order of 
the cosmos are purer than those who deal with the order of society and the 
latter are purer than those who deal with economic order, and all who deal 
with order are  purer than those who traffic in anti-order. Meanings in each 
order below the cosmic presuppose the meanings of the cosmic order, and 
the meanings of the economic order presuppose the meanings of the social 
order (cf. Dumont 1970:69, 72, 165). As suggested previously, each varna 
is identified with one of these orders. Diagram 10 illustrates this identifica- 
tion and the relations among orders. 
D I ~ G I I  10 Mruus I X I ~ R % ? , \  = A D I I A I I M  i It IS worthy ol notc that thls 
same hicrarchlc class~ficatron is used in cta\\~lying thc four lrfe \t'iges (cf 
Tylcr 1973 92) 
In th,e jajmiini system the relations between varnas, with the exception 
of the Sfidra, are directly derived from the kind of order (dharma, ar'tha, 
kzma) characteristic of each varna. Thus, what the VaiSya has to  give is 
some economic good, the Ksatriya political power, and the Briihman 
religious aut,hority. Save his labor, which must be directed by the twice-born 
varnas, the Stidra contributes nothing to order. In fact, he must always he 
controlled and subjugated because he stands for anti-order. Like the de- 
mons whom he symbolizes, his power to  create disorder must be yoked and 
made to serve the ends of legitimate order. Just as the demons and disorder 
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are the logical counterparts of deities and order, the Sfidra is the functional 
counterpart of the twice-born varnas. 
THE GENERATION OF HOMOLOGICAL STRUCTURES 
Turning now to the question of individual jiitis, I argue that, although it 
is theoretically possible to  change the varna categories by increasing or 
decreasing their number and by adding o r  subtracting the necessary attribu- 
tional criteria for each category added o r  deleted, this is not the kind of 
change that is typical. Both ethnographically for actual jgti groups and a s  
a historic cognitive model, the trend has been toward expansion, but ex- 
pansion only a t  the terminal nodes, not a t  the level of the attributes which 
define the four major classes. We thus face the same problem as  the ancient 
k s t r i c  authors: "how d o  we get more than four classes out of this system'?" 
and we resolve the question in precisely the same way: by expanding terminal 
nodes.5 T o  clarify the point, it is quite obvious that the system of logical 
oppositions in a semantic tree will generate as many distinct classes as we 
want, so long as the number of attributes is one less than the number of 
classes, but this soon becomes cumbersome and confusing as it rapidly 
overtaxes human memory. We want a system that combines the projective 
power of the semantic tree with the obvious mnemonic advantages of the 
four classes defined by easily accessible attributes. One way to  d o  this is to  
expand the terminal nodes, but to expand them on exactly the same princi- 
ples as those on which the original structure is founded. Each nodal expan- 
sion then is simply a homomorphism of the original four-class structure. 
This expansion is represented in diagram 1 1 (p. 138). 
Although 1 have used different attributes (a, b, c, d) in the lower half of 
diagram 11, that is not necessary; some of the same attributes (e.g., y and 
z) could be used recursively. The important point is that so long as each 
expansion is based on the logic of the underlying form, that is, is a model 
of the original, each will simply repeat the structure of the original ad 
infiniturn. Each is a homology of the original cognitive model. Similarly, I 
have represented subcategorization in the nodal expansion as what I call a 
srricr hierarchy, that is, a tree diagram that permits only left-hand branch- 
ing, but subcategorization a t  the @ti level commonly permits both left- and 
right-hand branching. Note that the expansion of C itself is a case of right- 
hand branching. Right-hand branching has no effect on hierarchy; it simply 
allows for a greater proliferation of ranked subcategories. 
I 
In the Sistric literature the mechanism for this expansion was inter- 
marriage between the original four varnas, and even though such varna 
intermarriage was generally discouraged, all of the Slistric texts agree in a 
hierarchical classification of marriages as  primary, involving marriage of 
persons belonging to  the same varna, and secondary, involving marriage of 
RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
/ 
etc. ctc. I 
t 
/ 
t c -  
C 2 C' various 
I I 
ctc. etc. etc. etc. ctc 
persons belonging t o  different varnas. Secondary marriages are further 
subdivided into two types: anuloma ("with the hair"), where the husband's 
varna is higher than the wife's; and pratiloma ("against the hair"), where 
the wife's status is higher than the husband's. This classification is illustrated 
in diagram 12. 
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+marriage in the same varna - , '
w - - 
primary secondary 
D I ~ G R A M  12. H I E R A R C I I I ~  C  ASSIFITATION D I I \ C R ~ M  13. CAYIEY Dli\GRAU OF MAR- 
or: MI\RRIACCS The order of hierarch~c rank n14Gf FYCII  IMGL. Prlmary marriages are 
15 from left lo right designated by looped arrows originating and 
terminating at the same alphabetical letter. 
Secondary marriages are designated by 
stratght arrows. Broken arrows mdicate 
pratiloma (inverse order) and solld arrows 
Indicate anuloma (proper order) marriageq. 
I 
Although Sgstric authorities differ on the definition of savarna, some desig- 
nating marriage between immediately adjacent twice-born varnas as savarna, 
others restricting the designation only to marriage between persons of the 
same varna, and still others allowing it to include marriages between 
Brahman and Ksatriya, but not between Ksatriya and VaiSya, the prejudice 
is still in favor of primary marriage only between persons belonging to the 
same varna. In general then, the system of marital exchange entailed by 
thisclassification is represented in diagram 13. 
In the h s t r a s ,  intermarriage between persons of different varnas inevitably 
produces new varna (j5ti) categories. Gautama (IV,  16-18, Biihler 1879: 
194-195), for example, derives the twelve additional groups given in dia- 
gram 14 from varna intermarriage. 
In diagram 14, those above the diagcnal are the result of marriages in the 
"inverse order" (pratiloma), that is, offspring of couples in which the wife's 
status is higher than the husband's; such offspring are degraded and are 
outside the pale of law. Those below the diagonal are mixed, but in the 
proper order-the husband's status is higher than the wife's. I t  can be 
<emonstrated that by this one simple expedient of varqa intermarriage the 
Siistric authors proposed a mechanism that could generate subcategories 
infinitely. In order to simplify, 1 will state the rules in axiomatic form as 
follows: 
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DIAGRAM 14. V A R ~ A  INTERMARRIAGI: AFTLR G ~ U T A M A .  Numerals in upper right-hand 
corners denote rank as ass~gned by converse IA below. For a d~fferent interpretat~on. 
see BaudhLyana ( l ,9.  17; Buhler 1882: 197-198). 
AXIOM 1: Offspring of parents belonging to the same group (or equally 
ranked groups) are assigned membership in their parents' 
group and the rank of their parents'group. 
I 
BrBhman 
2 
Savarna 
8 
Nis%da 
10 
PiiraSava 
This simply means that the child of Brrihman parents, for example, is a 
BrZhman. This rule has the effect of preserving the order of the original 
four varnas, but does not generate new groups. 
I I 
SQta 
3 
Ksatriya 
4 
Ambasfha 
9 
DauSyanta 
13 
Ksattri 
12 
Mrighadha 
5 
VaiSya 
Ugra 
CONVERSE 1 : Offspring of parents belonging to two different (unequally 
ranked) groups constitute a group different from either of 
their parents'groups. 
16 
CZindBla 
15 
Vaideha 
14 
Ayogava 
1 7 
SDdra 
It is actually this converse of the normal rule of marriage that provides 
the generative power of the system. Each inter-varna marriage produces a 
newjzti category. This isdemonstrated in diagram 15. 
Where the offspring of parents belonging to  different groups are assigned 
membership in unique groups, such intermarriage has the capability of 
producing infinitely many new groups. Although diagram 15 illustrates 
this point, it is somewhat inaccurate in that it neither reflects a particular 
pattern of constraints on varna intermarriage nor indicates how new varnas 
are integrated into the ranking system. It only generates new groups, but 
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DIAGRAM 15 GENERATION OF NEW JATIS HY INTLRVARNA 9ND INTERJATI MARRIAGE 
Broken arrow ind~cates marriage, so l~d  arrow ~ndlcates descent. Thus, for example, 
The offspring of B and K IS X This axtom 1s w~dely represented In AustralIan mar- 
rlage systems which. however, do not produce new groups ~nfinitely because the 
groups repeat in cycles of var~ous  length. 
does not preserve ranking. This suggests that the converse of axiom I 
should be restated in some way that would reflect both of these features. 
CONVERSE 1A: Offspring of parents belonging to  adjacently ranked 
groups are assigned membership in groups ranked 
higher than their mother's group and lower than their 
father's group. 
This is illustrated in diagram 16. 
Not surprisingly, the pattern of marriage in diagram 16 is consistent with 
an improbable marriage rule: cross cousin marriage for males of new 
categories and females of old categories, but with parallel cousin marriage 
for males of oId categories and females of new categories. But it need not 
be interpreted in this way. All marriages are in the proper direction- 
husbands are higher status than wives, and each successor varna is assigned 
a rank higher than its female predecessor and lower than its male prede- 
cessor. 
For completeness, converse 1 A implies: 
CONVERSE IB: Offspring of parents belonging to non-adjacently 
ranked groups are assigned membership in groups 
ranked lower than either of their parents'groups. 
And finally: 
AXIOM 2: Offspring whose mother's group rank is higher than the 
father's group rank are assigned membership in groups 
ranked lower than either parent's groups and lower than off- 
spring whose father's group rank is higher than the mother's 
group rank. 
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It is to be emphasized that  the generation of new jzti categories through 
varna intermarriage has precisely the result predicated in diagram I I .  
Each terminal node is capable of infinite expansion by recursive operation 
of a single set of rules. Now it is not my argument that this model is ethno- 
graphically correct. In the first place, there are certain obvious demographic 
problematics inherent in the uppermost and lowest categories, but more 
Importantly, 1 d o  not want to argue that varna intermarriage is the mech- 
anism of varna orjat i  proliferation. It is, of course, the sign of segmentation, 
not the cause of it. Secondly, variant patterns of anuloma marriages are 
amply documented both in the $;istric texts and in ethnographic accounts. 
For example, examination of diagram 14 will quickly reveal that the 
marriage relations and relative rankings of that diagram d o  not entirely 
correspond with those of diagram 16. There are several reasons for this 
discrepancy. In the first place, the texts d o  not explicitly carry the prolifer- 
ation of varnas from the intermarriage of adjacent vargas beyond one 
degree of intermarriage. They are more concerned with the consequences 
of pratiloma marriage and intermarriage between non-adjacent vargas 
which are not shown in diagram 16. T o  understand the rankings generated 
by diagram 16, we must amend the original classification of marriages 
(diagram 12). We must separate marriage between adjacent vargas (cf. 
converse 1A) from marriage between non-adjacent varnas (cf. converse 
marriage in marriage in 
same varna different varna 
marriage to marriage to  
man of higher man of lower 
varna varoa 
D I ~ G R ~ M  17. PARADIGM OF JXTIS  CREATED BY M A R R I A G E  TYPES. Capital letters indicate 
?ales, lower case letters ~ n d ~ c a t e  females. B = BrZhman, K = K~atriya,  V = VaiSya. S = 
Siidra. Conjunct~on of letters indicates ~ntermarriage. Thus Bk denotes marriage of a 
BrZhmavmale witha Ksatriyafemale. 
pratiloma 
Kb,Vk,Sv 
Vb,Sk 
S b  
savarna 
Bb,Kk,Vv,Ss 
anuloma 
Bk,Xv,Vs 
Bv,Ks 
Bs 
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2A), and the latter from pratiloma marriages. The classification of mar- 
riages then is: marriage in the same varna; marriage of a female with a man 
of the higher adjacent varna; marriage of a female with a man of a higher 
non-adjacent varna; marriage of a female with a man of a higher non- 
adjacent varna, one or two degrees of adjacency removed; and finally, 
pratiloma marriages which are in turn divided into adjacent, non-adjacent, 
and two degrees of non-adjacency. Diagram 17 illustrates the relations 
between these categorizations of marriages, and the jltis created by each 
marriage type. 
The ranking of j2itis is not immediately evident from diagram 17, but 
may be "keyed out" with the key illustrated indiagram 18," 
D I . \ G R A M  18. KEY DIAGRAM OF J ~ T I  RANKS CREATED t3Y MARRIAGE TYPES. Ranking I5 from left to 
rlght Capital letters ind~cate  males, lowercase letters females. 
This classification captures the following notions: ( I )  offspring of 
savarna marriages should retain the rank of their parents, and should rank 
higher than offspring of anuloma marriages; (2) offspring of anuloma 
marriages among adjacent varnas should rank higher than offspring of 
anuloma marriages among non-adjacent varnas; (3) anuloma offspring 
of higher ranked adjacent varnas should be higher than anuloma offspring 
of lower ranked adjacent varnas; (4) anuloma offspring of non-adjacent 
varnas are ranked by degree of non-adjacency, those having the same 
degree of non-adjacency being ranked among one another in terms of the 
relative ranks of their parent varnas; ( 5 )  offspring of all anuloma marriages 
are ranked higher than offspring of pratiloma marriages; (6) offspring of 
pratiloma marriages rank among themselves on the basis of the same 
principles (i.e., 2-4) as  those governing ranking among the offspring of 
anuloma marriages. 
By contrast, the rules underlying diagram 16 indicate that the rankings 
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derived from marriage with adjacent varnas are given by the following 
rules: ( 1 )  a new jati created by the intermarriage of adjacently ranked 
varnas is given a rank equivalent to  the rank of its "mother's" varna plus 
the number of new and old jstis previously generated by intermarriage of 
all higher ranking varnas and jZtis. (2) The rank of a n  "old" jHti resulting 
from intermarriage in the same varna is its original rank plus the number 
of new and old jHtis previously generated by the intermarriage of all higher 
ranking varnas and jztis. T o  clarify: Let I = number of new varnas, R = 
9riginal rank of a varna (where Brahman = I, Ksatriya = 2, VaiSya = 3, 
Sfidra = 4), then 1 + R for marriage within the same varna produces the 
following rankings. 
For intermarriage with adjacent varnas where R = rank of the "mother" 
varna, we have the following: 
Rankings beyond 7 in diagram 18 are the result of intermarriage between 
non-adjaceht varnas and are  derived from the following rule: new vargas 
generated by intermarriage between non-adjacent varnas are assigned the 
rank of their "father's" varna plus the total number of varnas previously 
created through marriage within the same varna and with adjacent varnas. 
Thus, intermarriage of a Brahman and a VaiSya, is I (the BrHhman's rank) 
plus 7 (the number of original varnas plus the number of new j5tis created 
through intermarriage) fo r  a total and ranking of 8. Diagram 14 carries 
out rankings for both anuloma and pratiloma marriages only to 10. In a 
very general way, ranking of new varnas is a function of the rank of inter- 
marryingvarnas, and the number and rank of other varnas. 
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Now the problem here is that the rankings produced by diagram 18 d o  
not agree w ~ t h  the rankings produced by diagram 16. On the one hand, 
diagram 18 preserves the relative ranks of the original varna groups, and 
ranks all other groups in terms of the kind of intermarriage that produced 
them. But on the other hand, diagram 16 does not preserve the relative 
ranks of the original four varnas, treating the offspring of savarna marriages 
as if they were the result of anuloma marriages. The rules of diagram 16 
have the effect of degrading every original varna category except the 
BrLahman, and penalizing marriage in the same varna. In Tn t ras t ,  the 
rules underlying diagram 18 have the effect of ranking the Siidra varna 
higher than a BrBhman or Ksatriya jiiti. The fact at issue is that axiom I ,  
w h ~ c h  preserves original varna rank, and converse I A ,  which does not 
preserve original varna iank, contradict one another. One way around this 
difficulty lies in exploiting the ambiguity of the concepts varna and jiiti. 
Thus categories beyond the first four varlys are interpreted as jLatis and as 
subclasses of the original varnas. T o  put it differently, only the rank of 
jLatis is affected by anuloma marriage, not the rank of varnas. The varnas 
are fixed ideological constants, but the j5tis are inconstant and variable, 
their variability explainable a s  departures from the rule requiring marriage 
within the same jLati. 
Another device is to place different constraints on  the ranking of groups 
springing from anuloma marriage. Thus, both the texts and contemporary 
jstis employ rules assigning offspring of anuloma marriage either to the 
father's j5ti or to  the mother's jiiti, rather than assigning them to  totally new 
jgtis. For  example, it is well known that jiiti intermarriage in Kerala follows 
some such degenerativeaxiom as: 
AXIOM 3: Offspring of any two adjacently ranked groups are assigned 
membership in the lower status group (i.e., the mother's 
group). 
This is illustrated in diagram 19. 
Also well attested in both texts and ethnographic accounts is the fact that 
something like the ameliorative converse of this axiom is illustrative of 
North Indian marriage patterns. Thus: 
CONVERSE 2: Offspring of any two adjacently ranked groups are as- 
signed membership in the higher status group (i.e., the 
father's group), 
This is illustrated in diagram 20. 
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Dr ~ G R  IM 19 OFFSPR~NC AS- DIAGRAM 20. OFFSPRING ASSIGNCD TO HIGHER STATIJS 
FIGNED TO LOWER STATIJS GROIJP. This rnarrlage rule IS cons~stent wlth patrt- 
This marrlage rule is consis- lineal descent and cross-cousin rnarrlage. 
tent w ~ t h  matril~neal descent 
and cross-cousin marrlage 
Again, these models encounter demographic difficulties (as do  some of 
the people whose behavior they model), but it should be noted that they 
are both conservative rather than generative. They do not create new 
groups from intergroup marriages. They maintain both the number of 
groups and their relative ranks. Thus, because both savarna and anuloma 
marriages conforming t o  axiom 3 and converse 2 conserve the social order, 
we can now understand why the definition of savarna was so variable. If a 
marriage maintained relative ranking it was savarna. 
But it will be noted that marriages corresponding to those of diagrams 
19 and 20 preserve the status quo only at the price of inability to generate 
new jZti categories. This leaves the function of generating new j5tis to non- 
adjacent and pratiloma marriages. The generative capacity of the former, 
however, is not unlimited. In the case of anuloma marriages between non- 
adjacent varnas, Manu (X. 64-65, Biihler 1886:416-417 ff,) allows that their 
offspring can be elevated to  the status of Briihmans by continued inter- 
marriage with Br3hmans through seven generations. Similar ameliorative 
rules appear in Apastamba (1 1 ,  5, 10-1 1, Biihler 1879: 125) and Gautama 
( I V  22-24, Biihler 1879:196-197 ff.). In Gautama's interpretation, the seven 
generation rule seems to apply only to cases of intermarriage between 
adjacent varnas, but the more general case is for this or a similar rule to 
apply t o  all varieties of varna intermarriage. Two other variant interpreta- 
tions are worthy of note. In one, the commentators interpret the rule as 
applying to repeated intermarriage between worthy persons of the same 
varna. Thus, if an excellent PBraSava man marries an excellent PBrahava 
female and his descendants do likewise for seven generations the offspring 
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in the seventh generation will be BrZhmans. In another interpretation 
(Manu X. 65 ff.), the number of generations required to  effect a transforma- 
tion in the status of a varna o r  j3ti is greater for lower-ranking groups 
an$ lesser for higher-ranking ones. While the offspring of a B r B h m a ~  and 
a Siidra (i.e., a P2raSava) attains the rank of a B r 3 h m a ~  through repeated 
BrBhman intermarriages in the seventh generation, the offspring of a 
Brxhman and Ksatriya (i.e,, a Savarga) attains BrBhman rank in the third 
generation, and those of a BrFihma~ and a VaiSya (i.e., a NisBda) in the 
fifth generation. 
It is tempting to  interpret all of these rules as cyclic permutations of 
period 7 (cf. Budden 1972:106-130). Thus, if the operator X is interpreted 
as the repeated marriage of a BrBhman with the six varpas (indicated by 
the numerals 1-6) created by anuloma marriage, then: 
In the seventh permutation the proper order is restored. But, because this 
permutation implies that "the first shall be last," it does not correspond 
with the marriage rules. That is, if these groups are ranked, there is no 
condition allowing for the varna designated by the numeral 1, for example, 
to be ranked last as i t  is in the second row above. We more nearly approxi- 
mate the situation if we let the names of anuloma varnas appearing in 
diagram 14 be represented by the initial letters of their respective names, 
their relative rank given by left to right order, and conceive of each re- 
peated Brghman marriage as having the effect of moving a varna u p  one 
rank in the hierarchy as indicated in diagram 21. 
It will be observed that a PZraSava (P) in diagram 21 attains the rank of a 
BrBhmav (B) in the seventh generation, a NisBda (N) in five generations, 
but a Savarna (S) requires only one generation rather than the three as- 
signed by Manu's rule. Despite this inconsistency and the distinct proba- 
bility that the numerals three, five, and seven have purely magical signifi- 
cance, it is my argument that a model of this sort underlies all these ideas 
of status amelioration through hierarchic marriage. Each intermarriage in 
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S A U N D P  
3 . 3 . 4 4 . 1 4  
B S A U N D  
5 . 3 . 4 . 1 3 .  
B S A U N  
. 1 3 . 3 . . 1  
B S A U  
B S A  
3 . 4  
B S 
D I ~ G R A M  21. R E P E ~ T C D  B R X H M A ~  (B) I Y T I K M I ~ R K I A G E  WITH V A R N A S  CRrATED 
R Y  ANIJLOMA MAKRIAGFS. 
the sequence produces offspring of a differing rank (e.g., Bp -, D). It may 
seem a curious inconsistency to argue on the one hand that intermarriage 
both creates and destroys new j2ti groups, but it is important to  point out 
that a kind of equilibrium is the result, and that this pulsating character of 
social order with its consequent equilibrium exactly parallels the Indian 
conception ofcosmicorder. We shall return to this point subsequently. 
It is obvious that the ameliorative rules operating on a finite set of groups 
will ultimately reduce all differentiated groups to a single group, and it is 
equally obvious that the anuloma rules that generate new groups will gener- 
ate groups infinitely, but if both sets of rules are taken in conjunction with 
one another, the result is equilibrium. Assume, for example, that instead of 
allowing groups to  become extinct by ameliorative rules as in diagram 21, 
we allow each extinguished group to  be replaced by an anuloma marriage. 
The result is a group structure broadly similar to  musical rounds, as illus- 
trated in diagram 22. 
There are, of course, certain problems with this method of representation 
since it does not indicate how groups S-P are created in each generation 
through anuloma marriage, but the main point concerning equilibrium is 
unaffected, Diagram 22 makes clear the possibility of conslant movement 
within a fixed structure. Groups constantly move up and down the scale of 
varqa ranks, but this endless movement neither generates structural change 
through the permutation of groups nor changes the fact of hierarchic rank- 
ing itself. The eflect of these rules is to produce both change andpermanence. 
In the order of society they are the analogs of creation and destruction in 
the cosmic order. 
On this point it is instructive to compare the effect of these Indian rules 
with, for example, the effect of the Murngin marriage rules. Weil, in the 
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S A U N D P  
& & . 1 . 1 & &  
B S A U N D ( P )  
J . . 1 & 3 . & 3 .  
B S A U N (D) (P) 
. b & +  6 
B S A U (N) (D) (P) 
J . 4 4 4  4 \1 
B S A (U) ( N )  (Dl (P) 
4 . t 2 . 1 J . J .  
B S (A) (U) (N) (D) (PI 
3 . . 1 + 6 + 6  
B (S) (A) (U) (N) (Dl fP) 
D I A G R ~ M  22. E Q U I L ~ R R ~ C ~ M  voDC1. 1.etters In parentheses ind~cate replacement 
of extinguished groups through cont~nued anuloma marriage 
appendix to Part I of Levi-Strauss's The Elementary Structures of Kinship 
(1969:221-229) represents the Murngin system as an Abelian group of 
cyclic permutations (p. 223). Like all systems of cyclic permutation, these 
have the effect of permuting the arrangement of groups through a fixed 
number of periods untit the final permutation, which returns the arrange- 
ment of groups to  its original state. As Levi-Strauss remarks, the structure 
"cannot evolve beyond its own formula" (p. 227). In the Murngin case there 
is no question of the manufacture of new groups nor of replacement of 
extinguished groups. The limitations of the Murngin system remarked 
upon by Levi-Strauss have to d o  with the fact that it preserves structure a t  
the cost of prohibiting the generation and incorporation of new groups. 
This limitation can be grasped most easily in an example of generalized 
exchange between four marriage classes. Consider the following: There are 
four classes: A, B, C, D. Men of A marry women of B, men of B women of 
C, men of C women of D,  and men of D women of A. Children of these 
unions are assigned membership in classes different from either of the 
parents' such that the children of a mother class A, B, C, D are respectively 
assigned to  B, C, D, A (cf. Levi-Strauss 1969:221-223; converse 2 p. 146, and 
diagram 15, p. 141. This system is illustrated in diagram 23. 
The cycle of permutations for this system is given as: 
A B C D  
B C D A  
X = C D A B  
A B  
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DI \GR IM 23 M A R R I  G ~  nrt 11 1015 tv A %'\TIM or G L N L K A L I Z L D  EX( I T ' I V G ~  Upper case letters 
ind~c;~tc n i ~ ~ l c ,  lower case female. S o l ~ d  alrows ind~cdte rnarrlage, broken arrows descent Thus 
thechildren o f a n A  rnananda bworndnarc Cc 
Each permutation can be read directly from diagram 23 by reading out 
from the center along the broken arrows. Thus, starting from A (aA) we 
have A, B, C, D, and moving clockwise in the direction of the solid marriage 
arrows to B (Bb) we have B, C, D, A, and so on. The original order A, R, 
C, D is restored in the fifth cycle. Clearly, this structure merely repeats 
itself endlessly. In comparison, the Indian marriage rules seem to imply a 
much morc open and variable system capable of change and development, 
but, as wc have just seen, the ameliorative rules and the generative rules 
cancel one another out. The net effect of generating and incorporating new 
groups, changes in their relations, their movement up and down in rank, 
is nil. They entail no change in structure and we see that the Indian rules 
conserve structure just a s  surely a s  the Murngin or  Kariera rules. It is of 
paramount importance, of course, that the Indian theorists, like their 
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Australian and French confrkres, should have seen the analogy between the 
exchange of women and the question of order, but it is in their effort to 
acconimodate change and development to the fixed structure of hierarchy 
that thc Indian theorists differ most significantly not only from the Aus- 
tralians, but from most others as well.' It is necessary to observe that this 
acconimodation between change and permanence is successful only because 
it accords a superior place to permanence, making change understandable 
only ~nsofai- a s  it exemplifies a deterministic order consistent with the 
principles of an  immutable hierarchic structure. Thus the vargas are  fixed, 
immutable categories of which the j2tis are variable and inconstant reflec- 
tions, but thcir variability is understandable because it theoretically never' 
produces a pattern inconsistent with the original h i e r a r ~ h y . ~  This is remin- 
isccnt of Aristotle's assignment of epistemic priority to the Species. Because 
i t  is immutable, the Species is the essential form, the object and source of 
philosophy. Individuai men may come and go; the Species is always the 
samc. Dete~minism is the goal of all quests for the natural laws governing 
the cosmos. Hut if this is the case, then change, evolution, development 
become problematic either because they are technically impossible- their 
effect ncutrali~ed because they can only endlessly I-eproduce the same 
stt-uct~ire-or, if  they are possible only as a conceptual category, they 211-e 
unaccounted for. Consequently, we are wrong to argue that the Indian and 
Mur-ngin systems are substantially different in character since both fail, 
albeit in different ways, to grow beyond a predetermined, fixed structure. 
As in contemporary science, an  infinitely expanding universe is possible 
only if its expansion preserves structure. There remains, however, the 
p~ obleni of pratiloma marriage. 
If thc generative capacity of anuloma marriage is negated by the opera- 
tion of ameliorative rules, then only pratiloma marriages produce new 
jatis - jZtis whose status cannot bc ameliorated by intermarriage with high- 
ranking vargas o r  jstis, and more importantly, whose existence threatens 
the right order of hierarchic precedence either. because their position is 
ambiguo~is or potentially competitive. Here too, we should note that there 
is no  readily apparent way to integrate these new jiltis Into the system of 
econoniic exchange." 
All of the texts agree that pratiloma marriages create "confusion of 
j2tis" or  overturn the established order of vartps, and they are unanimous 
in enjoining all to avoid pratiloma unions. Since pratiloma marriages pro- 
duce a I-anking that operates on the same principles as anuloma marriages, 
i t  is at f ~ r s t  difficult to see why they incur +uch aversion. The reason is that 
pratiloma marriages create new categories whose position in the hierarchy 
is potentially competitive with the normal hierarchic order. Consider 
diagram 24. 
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 DIAGRAM^^. PRAT~LOMA A R R I A G E  
Now there is nothing in diagram 24, or in the marriage rule that generates 
it (converse 1) that automatically determines the rank of X, Y, Z either 
with respect to one another or to B, K, V, S. Their position in the hierarchy 
is ambiguous. On the other hand, in a pratiloma marriage the ranking 
generated by converse 1A should be: S>Z>V>Y>K>X>B (where > is 
transitive and designates "is higher than"), which has the disturbing 
effect of completely inverting the original hierarchy! This result may not 
be immediately self-evident. The reasoning is as follows: if a child is assigned 
a group ranking higher than his mother's and X is a child of b and K then 
X>B, and if a child is assigned a group ranking lower than his father's and 
X is a child of K then K>X, and if K > X  and X>B then K>B and so on. 
Because pratiloma marriages thus forebode inversion of the established 
order, it is small wonder that they were calumniated and the progeny of 
such unions thought to be so degraded that they were outside the law. 
Since the progeny of pratiloma unions are considered to be outside the 
law, it is tempting to see the contrast between pratiloma and savarpal 
anuloma as an underlying contrast between order and chaos, but because 
chaos implies the absence of order, this is not the appropriate contrast. A 
contrast is involved here between the righr order (dharma) and the wrong 
order (adharma), or more simply order and anti-order. It is the contrast 
between righteousness and unrighteousness symbolized on the one hand by 
the deities and on the other by the demons. Pratiloma marriages thus sym- 
bolize the demoniacal, and evil not only exists, it has a structure.lO 
If dharma and adharma simply indicate evaluations of different orders, 
rather than order versus the absence of order, there is still a question about 
what concept might indicate the sense of chaos as the absence of order. I 
argue here that the contrast between dharma and adharma, as well as 
between anuloma and pratiloma, derives from a higher order contrast 
which entails not so much a contrast between order and chaos in the sense 
of the latter as absence of order, but rather a contrast between states of 
affairs in which questions of order are appropriate and states of affairs in 
which questions of order are inappropriate. This contrast refers to a dual- 
istic conception of the universe as being composed of active (prakyti) and 
passive or quiescent (purusa) components and states. If the universe is in 
an active state or if a question refers to the activity of the universe, then 
questions of order are relevant, otherwise not. That is to say, prakfti is a 
necessary presupposition to any question about dharma. The concept 
corresponding to the condition in which questions of order are irrelevant is 
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moksa (liberation). As order (dharma) corresponds to  the active state, the 
irrelevance of order (moksa) corresponds to  the passive state. This is illus- 
trated indiagram 25. 
Active + Prakrti - i (Praklti) - 
Order + Activity - 
+ (dharma ,) - I \ 
dharma, adharma moksa rajas tamas sattva 
DIAGRAM 25. CATEGORIZATION OF ORDFR. DIAGRAM 26. RELATION OF GUNA CATC- 
Dharma, indicates the sense of dharma GORIES. 
as order, dharma, asrrght order. 
In general then, savarqa/anuIoma marriages are marriages according to  
dharma, and pratiloma marriages are marriages according to adharma. 
Both savarr)a/anuloma and pratiloma are ordered (dharmal), the latter 
being the inverse of the former. 
We are now in a position to  understand why savar$a/anuloma marriages 
are better than pratiloma marriages, but one other question remains un- 
clear. Why is it possible for a child to be ranked higher than his mother, 
but not possible for a child to be ranked higher than his father? In part the 
answer has to  d o  with the general idea that male seed is superior to the 
field in which it is sown (Manu X. 69-72, Biihler 1886:418). The male thus 
contributes more than the female in the sense that his contribution is more 
determinative of the outcome. A theory is involved, then, about the relative 
heritability of qualities from each of a child's parents. Here I argue that 
the theory of heritability of qualities has ultimate reference to the concept 
that all things in the universe consist of three strands of qualities known a s  
gunas, and that the character of anything is determined by its particular 
guva make-up. The three gunas are rajas, tamas, and sattva. Rajas stands 
for activity, lightness, movement; tamas, the opposite of rajas, stands for 
inactivity, weight, inertia, darkness; and sattva, the opposite of rajas and 
tamas, stands for balance, equilibrium, purity. They are all subdivisions of 
prakyti, but since rajas and tamas are capable of acting only when in dis- 
equilibrium, it is obvious that sattva is identified with purusa and moksa, 
and rajas and tamas with prakyti and dharma. This is illustrated in dia- 
gram 26. 
By analogic extension it is clear that with reference to marriage, anuloma 
marriages are characterized by excessive rajas guga, pratiloma by excessive 
tamas guna, and because they d o  not create movement of @is, savarva 
A POINT OF ORDER 155 
marriages are sattvic. With specific reference to  the heritability of qualities, 
the analogical identities are rajas + tamas = female, and sattva = male.ll 
Just as  sattva guga dominates the other gunas by keeping them in equilib- 
rium, the male contribution to offspring dominates the female contribution, 
and since every child is the conjunction of these male and female elements 
there is no way that a child can be ranked higher than his father. The 
greater natural tendency is for degradation. 
T o  sum up, purusa and prakrti symbolize a whole series of fundamental 
antinomies in Indian thought. Purusa stands for equilibrium, passive 
potency, immutability, non-creation, moksa (non-order), pure uncreated 
being, the undifferentiated, non-formation, non-causality, timelessness: 
in a word, the real (BrBhma~).  In contrast, prakrti is equivalent to  dis- 
equilibrium, active power, mutability, creation, dharma (order), impure 
created existence, differentiation, transformation, the law of causality 
(karma), time: in a word, the unreal (m8ya). These oppositions are tabu- 
lated in diagram 27. Prakrti is a kind of primitive Newtonian force, having 
positive and negative poles. So, just as the positive dharma (order) is 
opposed by the negative adharma (anti-order), the gods are opposed by 
the demons, dvija by Siidra, light by dark, Aryan civilization by aboriginal 
savagery, and in a sense, culture by nature. These oppositions are repre- 
sented in diagram 28 (cf. Tyler 1973:94). 
DI { G R A M  27. FIINDAM~NTAI. OI'I'OSI TION?  IF! D I  {CHAM 28 POSITIVE A N D  NEGATIVE DIV1- 
i h ~ 1 . 1 ~  THOIIGIIT. SXONSOF PRXKRTI. 
PIIRII>X 
eqtl~l ibrl~~rn 
pa%\lve potency 
~mmt~tab~l i ty  
non-creatlon 
m o k p  
purc being 
und~ffercnt~at~on 
non-format~on 
non-cauiallty 
t~nlele\sne$\ 
the real (RrBhma?) 
PRAKRTI 
d~sequil~brtum 
active power 
mutab~lity 
creation 
dharma 
lmpure ex~stence 
d~fferentlatlon 
tr;~nsformat~on 
causality (karma) 
tlme 
the unreal(mZya) 
PRAKRTI 
Porlrlve 
dharma 
gods 
~ a j a s  
twice-born 
hght 
.Zryan 
culture 
N e ~ a f  I 1.e
adharma 
demons 
tamas 
once-born 
dark 
non-Aryan 
nature 
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Perhaps the discerning reader will have perceived the familiar structuralist 
triangle lurking in the background of this discussion. Thus we have diagram 
29. 
sattva 
(anuloma) (pratiloma) 
dharma <-> adharma 
T o  draw the contrast with Western thought, it remains only to point out 
that purusa is the good, prakrti evil. In this scheme cosmogony as the 
narrative sequence of the origin and development of the universe is reduced 
to cosmology, a stable pattern of timeless concepts. Process succumbs to 
structure. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sdstric authors were faced with a dilemma. The sacred texts unani- 
mously insisted on the division of society into four classes, but the world 
consisted of a great many more than four classes. Since the four classes 
were part of sacred authority, they could not simply be jettisoned; a way 
had to be found t o  reconcile the texts and the facts. The solution fastened 
upon was to derive the contemporary non-conforming classes Cjstis) from 
the scriptural classes ( v a r ~ a s )  through the mechanism of class intermarriage, 
each intermarriage producing a new class. But there is more here than a 
simple question of the number of classes. The four varpas of sacred authority 
are ranked, and that ranking reflects basic notions about morality and law, 
and entails other basic notions about politics and economics-it signifies, 
in short, the social order. The problem then is not just how to increase the 
number of classes, but how to  increase them without destroying social 
order. In concrete terms, the overt question is: "how can rank be assigned 
to  t h ~  new classes produced by varga intermarriage?'ln more cosmic terms, 
the Siistric authors asked the underlying question: "how can we simultane- 
ously account for permanence and impermanence, persistence and change, 
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order and chaos?'Their answer to the latter was that there was an immu- 
table macrocosmic order from which the mutable microcosm derived, and 
which it reflected. As Manu puts it, they constructed "a mutable universe 
from immutable ideas" (1.19, Jones 1796:3). This answer had the salutary 
effect of both vindicating the sacred texts and accounting for the world. As 
for the former question, the answers proposed were various in details, but 
more or less consistent in their general aims. There are two problems: 
assignment of group membership and assignment of group rank, and the 
aim is that both should be automatically determined by the kind of mar- 
riage. 
By now it  should be clear that the whole theory of marriage in the S ~ s t r a s  
is part of an immense homological structure wh?se ultimate categories 
have to do with cosmology and cosmogony. The SZistric authors proceed 
by piling one homology on top of another, stretching the initial root metit- 
phor of creation to cover more and more conceptual territory, gradually 
bringing every aspect of the universe into a coherent relation. Underlying 
this structure is a dominating system of archetypal concepts consisting of 
key words and symbols whose interconnections provide the ultimate source 
of structure and whose extensions through metaphoric processes create 
new structures. AH ordered conceptual domains, whether of religion, 
science, literature, or myth, operate according to these processes of meta- 
phoric representation. Scientists and other ideologues share the same 
ultimate monomaniacal aim-to bring more and more of the facts of the 
world under the control of a guiding analogy or metaphor. None has yet 
mat5hed the coherence of the enormous homological structure erected hy 
the SZstric authors. It is both a tribute and a challenge to the human im- 
agination. 
If it is objected that the Indian solution to the probIem of order and 
change is either incoherent or unpalatable because it contemplates a cosmic 
condition that is neither ordered nor disordered, a great emptiness that is 
yet the ultimate source of all things, consider the state of contemporary 
thought, Modern science encourages us to believe that certain isolated 
systems become progressively disordered and that certain isolated systems 
become progressively ordered. The concept of enfropy thus calls for the 
development of disorder from order while evolution foresees order develop- 
ing from disorder. Are we to conclude that these two produce equilibrium, 
or are they conveniently in complementary distribution throughout the 
universe? Did the universe originate in chaos or  is that merely its terminus? 
If order emerges from chaos, does this not mean that the latter somehow 
contains and engenders the former and that we may speak of chaos as the 
fecund repository of order, as the sum of all orders, as that totality of order 
which is not itself an order, but mereIy the possibility of it? Must we too, 
then conclude that all possible orders coexist, that past, present, and future 
are only illusory refractions of the timeless present? 
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NOTES 
I Thls paper contalns some of the analys~s beh~nd portions of lndro An Anlhropolofiita/ 
Prrcpettive(Ty1er 1973)- which could not be included there because of ~ t s  technical nature Parts 
of t h ~ s  paper were presented In talks before the Anthropology Department of Southern lllino~s 
Unlvcrs~ty In March, 1973, and the Anthropology Department of Mlchigan State Un~vers~ty 
rn March, 1974 The research on whlch it is based was supported by nobody. 
2 Slstra denotes "science, ~nstruction," and the S ~ s t r l c  literature devoted to explanat~ons 
of scriptures and sacrif~c~al  ritual. SCstric l~terature and the commentaries on it began sometlme 
In the second century A.D., and contlnue down to the present era 
3 That 15, the set V 1s closed under the b~nary  relation (*) "glves to"; "gives to" IS associa- 
tlve, there IS an identrty element (each glves to hlmself In t h ~ s  case), each element has an inverse. 
Formally. a group 1s an ordered p a r  (G, *) such that ~t has closure = Vx,,~G=+x*yt-G; asso- 
clativlty = VX,I:ZEG (.rc*y) *5 = X*  C Y * ~ ) ;  ident~ty = Vxt-G, 3 e ~ G  such that x*e = e*x = rc; 
Inverse V~t -G,3r ' such  that .\.I' =.rj.u = e (Budden 1972:73). Both closure and associativity seem 
incongruous in the case of "gives to." On closure for thls relat~on, see Tyler (1973.164-165) 
Assoclat~v~ty is more complex and may not be demonstrable In t h ~ a  case. 
4 The maln polnt about homotog~es IS that any homological mapping of elements from 
one set to another preserves the structural properties of the o r ~ g ~ n a l  set, but not the ~ndiv~dualtty 
of the elements. If the elements are mapped one-to-one, then t h e ~ r  indtv~dual~ty is preserved 
and the rclation between the two sets 1s ~somorphlc, ~nvolvlng perhaps nothlng more than a 
change In the names of the elements. 
5. The h s t r a s  also employ other means. There IS, for example, a group of jltls referred 
to as VrZtyas. formed not by Intermarriage and nodal expanslon. but by fa~lure to perform 
Aryan sacrifices and to  live according to the law. They are members of once high varnas Who 
have beendegraded through their failure to  fulfill the sacred obligations of their v a r p .  Offspring 
produced by adultery cornm~tted by persons of different varqas, Improper marriages (including 
marriages with non-Aryans), and neglect of prescr~bed uttes all give rise to a eonfusion of castes. 
All groups so created are vBhya (excluded from the community of Aryans), and they follow 
polluting occupations forbidden to the twice born (Manu X, 20-24, 46; Buhler 1886.405-407, 
413) Because they are excluded, all may be referred to a s  Dasyus (slaves, aboriginals). How 
groups created by these processes const~tuted themselves as sotral groups is as obscure in the 
texts as it is In my diagrams. We can only assume that that which 1s Intended IS a5 feas~ble as 
any other analyslscalling for group flssion. 
6 As Kay (1969) pornts out, a key is not a semanticarrangement. It is an arbitrary device 
for showing the d i s t r~but~on  f equally arbitrary dtchotomous contrasts over a set of lexemes. 
It can be used to represent other semantic structures, but IS not itself a semantic structure. 
7 On the importance of the notion of development or expanslon in Indian mythology 
and philosophy, see Tyler (1973:72-73) 
8 To  put the matter formally permutation of the rank order of varqas B, K ,  V, S is not 
permissible, but permutation of jBtls is, That ib, there 1s no leg~timate operator that would 
permute varva ranks as for example: 
= (:z) , but there is an inadmissible operator (pratiloma marriage) which 
could conceivably invert rank order. Thus: y = . Similarly, there are 
operators (for example rules of commensality and connubial~ty, economic power, and numerical 
preponderance) which have the effect of permuting jZti ranks, but thls would not affect varqa 
ranks. 
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9. Although the verse IS not clear, Manu X, 41 (Buhler 1886:412), says that six sons be- 
gotten on women of equal and the next lower castes (anantara) have the duties of the twice-born. 
~ 1 1  others have duties equal to S ~ d r a s .  The verse is not clear because the six sons seem to refer to 
all the anulomas produced by Intervarva marriage, but the phrase "next lower" implies only 
anulomas whoare produced by intermarriage of adjacent varnas. It is to be noted that in Manu's 
system the latter would all be classed as savarca, and their status would therefore be unproblem- 
atic. In general, the context favors the interpretation that al! anulomas have duties equivalent 
to the twtce-born and all pratilomas have duties equtvalent to Scdras. 
10. T h ~ s  contrast 1s also reflected in the eight-fold classtficatton of marriages. See Tyler 
(n d.) 
I I. Note that this identiftcatton confounds the putative cognittve universal c~ ted  by Osgood 
and Rtchards (1973.380-382,409-411) which assigns acrrvirv or  an acllve component to the male 
and places a posittve value on this assignment. Accordtng to Osgood the semantic components 
tnale and acrrve are all positively valued (good). In support of this universal he cites the Chinese 
case of Ytn and Yang. By contrast, the Indian system netther values aciivitv nor asstgns it to the 
component mole. In the Indian scheme, acttvity is bad, and is assigned to the component fetnale. 
The systems agree only in assigning the valuation had t o  the female component. For details, see 
Tyler (1973:70-73,86,90-94). 
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